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It is well established that the comprehension of spoken words referring to object concepts relies on
high-level visual areas in the ventral stream that build increasingly abstract representations. It is much
less clear whether basic low-level visual representations are also involved. Here we asked in what task
situations low-level visual representations contribute functionally to concrete word comprehension using
an interference paradigm. We interfered with basic visual processing while participants performed a
concreteness task (Experiment 1), a lexical-decision task (Experiment 2), and a word class judgment task
(Experiment 3). We found that visual noise interfered more with concrete versus abstract word process-
ing, but only when the task required visual information to be accessed. This suggests that basic visual
processes can be causally involved in language comprehension, but that their recruitment is not automatic
and rather depends on the type of information that is required in a given task situation.
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In recent decades, the view that the conceptual system under-
lying language comprehension is to a non-negligible extent based
on sensory-motor (and potentially other kinds of) experience has
been very dominant. In recognition of the symbol grounding
problem (Harnad, 1990), most contemporary theories of concep-
tual processing assume that it relies at least partly on modality-
specific systems (e.g., Barsalou, 1999, 2008, 2016; Binder &
Desai, 2011; Meteyard, Cuadrado, Bahrami, & Vigliocco, 2012).
Binder and colleagues (2016), for instance, have proposed a frame-
work of conceptual processing based on a set of primitive expe-
riential features that capture the various kinds of experience asso-
ciated with a given concept (sensory, motor, affective, social, etc.).
Their approach focuses on the kinds of cognitive/neural experience
related to a concept meaning that, for instance, all neural states
triggered by encounters with dogs are part of the experience
related to the concept dog. A model based on such experiential
attributes was recently used to predict brain activation patterns in
response to sentences (Anderson et al., 2016). Relevant for the
present study, their model predicts that object concepts tend to rely
on visual processes. An important question is what types of visual
processes are involved during (e.g., spoken) word processing.
Here, we investigated the recruitment of low-level visual processes
during object word processing and their dependence on task de-
mands.
The visual system has been implicated in the processing of
object concepts in the past decades based on neuroimaging studies
that localized their neural correlates to high-level visual cortex that
is generally assumed to build increasingly holistic object repre-
sentations along the posterior-to-anterior axis during perception
(Bracci & Op de Beeck, 2016; DiCarlo & Cox, 2007). Initial
univariate fMRI studies on object recognition localized selective
activation in response to pictures of animate versus inanimate
items to distinct portions of fusiform gyrus and lateral occipital
cortex (Chao, Haxby, & Martin, 1999; Chao, Weisberg, & Martin,
2002; for review see Martin, 2007). More recently, several fMRI
studies using multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) reported suc-
cessful decoding of conceptual categories based on picture stimuli
from ventral temporal areas (Haxby et al., 2001; Shinkareva et al.,
2008). Similar results have been obtained using written words
(Devlin, Rushworth, & Matthews, 2005) as well as spoken words
(Noppeney, Price, Penny, & Friston, 2006), and recent MVPA
studies managed to decode the conceptual category across differ-
ent input modalities from activity patterns in ventral occipitotem-
poral cortex (Shinkareva et al., 2011; Simanova et al., 2014).
Finally, several studies suggest that lesions in visual association
cortex lead to specific impairments for concepts that depend on
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visual knowledge (Capitani et al., 2009; Damasio, Tranel,
Grabowski, Adolphs, & Damasio, 2004; Tranel, Damasio, &
Damasio, 1997). Overall, there seems to be a fair amount of
consensus that high-level visual representations are consistently
used for conceptual processing of concrete objects because they
provide representations that are both abstract and grounded (Bar-
salou, 2016; Binder & Desai, 2011; Binder, Desai, Graves, &
Conant, 2009; Fernandino, Binder, et al., 2015; Martin, 2007),
although it is certainly still debated to what extent sensory systems
and conceptual systems overlap and to what extent they are sep-
arate (Binder, 2016; Goldinger et al., 2016; Mahon, 2015).
For the question of what types of visual processes are involved
it is important to note that the relative consistency of the neural
systems recruited by certain types of concepts does not imply
conceptual stability. For one thing, even the typical category
effects (such as inanimate vs. animate) are localized to varying
cortical areas across studies (Devlin et al., 2002; Thompson-Schill,
2003; Martin & Chao, 2001; for a review see Gerlach, 2007).
Moreover, context effects in language processing are ubiquitous
(Hoenig, Sim, Bochev, Herrnberger, & Kiefer, 2008; Kiefer &
Martens, 2010; Lebois, Wilson-Mendenhall, & Barsalou, 2015;
Nieuwland & van Berkum, 2006; Solomon & Barsalou, 2004;
Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995; van
Berkum, Brown, & Hagoort, 1999; Yee, Ahmed, & Thompson-
Schill, 2012), such that, for instance, even the blueness of the
concept blue is not always activated (Besner, Stolz, & Boutilier,
1997; Goldfarb, Aisenberg, & Henik, 2011; Jacoby, Lindsay, &
Hessels, 2003; see Kemmerer, 2014b for discussion) and different
modality-specific systems can be recruited for the same object
words depending on whether the task stresses visual or action
properties (Hoenig et al., 2008). These findings suggest that con-
ceptual processing is not adequately described as the retrieval of
fixed conceptual representations but rather as a constructive pro-
cess in which concepts are “built on the spot” recruiting different
kinds of representational systems depending on task demands. In
such an account it is conceivable that conceptual processing makes
use of basic visual processes to serve high-level (object) word
comprehension, at least when detailed visual information is useful.
Such an account receives support from recent studies reporting the
activation of low-level representations in the motor domain (Hauk,
Johnsrude, & Pulvermüller, 2004; Shtyrov, Butorina, Nikolaeva,
& Stroganova, 2014) and the visual domain (Correia et al., 2014;
Desai, Binder, Conant, & Seidenberg, 2009; Hwang, Palmer,
Basho, Zadra, & Müller, 2009; Mitchell et al., 2008; Ostarek &
Huettig, in press). We are aware that it is not straightforward to
draw a clear-cut low versus high level distinction in modality-
specific systems. However, we find it useful to distinguish be-
tween processes related to individual local features that tend to be
processed in early visual areas and processes related to holistic
perception of entire objects that tends to rely on ventral temporal
areas.
The Present Study
On the basis of these considerations, it seems plausible that
language comprehension can be achieved by different processing
channels that vary dynamically with contextual demands. One
such channel, on which we focused in this study, is the access to
low-level visual processes. There is some neuroimaging evidence
that object words can activate occipital cortex (Correia et al., 2014;
Hwang, Palmer, Basho, Zadra, & Müller, 2009; Lewis & Poeppel,
2014; Mitchell et al., 2008), and we have recently found that object
words rapidly activate basic low-level visual processes related to
the mere detection of a stimulus using continuous flash suppres-
sion (Ostarek & Huettig, in press). However, the functional role of
low-level visual processes for concrete word comprehension
across different processing situations is still unknown. One impor-
tant step was made by an elegant study (Meteyard, Zokaei, Bah-
rami, & Vigliocco, 2008) showing interference of dot patterns
moving up versus down with the comprehension of verbs that
imply motion in the corresponding direction (e.g., with rise vs.
fall). In the present study, we used a paradigm allowing us to test
for a functional involvement of basic visual processes during
semantic processing of a class of words that rely on visual knowl-
edge more generally. We interfered with basic visual processing
while participants were performing different tasks on individual
nouns to investigate whether and under what circumstances low-
level visual representations are causally involved in the compre-
hension of concrete words. We used dynamic Mondrian-type
masks changing at ca. 10 Hz consisting of rectangles of different
colors and sizes. Thereby interference was targeted at visual pro-
cesses related to edge detection, the perception of colors and
orientations, processes that are typically considered low-level as
they are the basic building blocks upon which higher-level repre-
sentations depend.
Although it is generally agreed that knowledge about visual
features is crucial for our understanding of concepts referring to
physical objects (e.g., Huettig, Mishra, & Olivers, 2012), the
long-standing and crucial question of the nature of the represen-
tations underlying this knowledge remains controversial. The flex-
ible conceptual processing account described in the Introduction
predicts that different kinds of features are recruited in situations
that require different kinds of information. In line with this, we
tested the hypothesis that low-level visual processes are recruited
specifically in situations where in-depth visual information needs
to be retrieved. The rationale we followed in this research is that
if (and only if) visual information associated with words is re-
trieved (at least partly) from low-level visual representations and
these are functionally involved in the comprehension process, then
interfering with basic visual processing should result in a cost for
object word processing. We manipulated the task requirements
across three experiments to assess the extent to which dynamic
low-level visual interference hindered the comprehension of con-
crete words when retrieval of visual information was task relevant
(concreteness judgment task, Experiment 1), when visual informa-
tion was irrelevant and semantic processing was minimal (LDT,
Experiment 2), and when visual information was irrelevant but
semantic processing was necessary (word class judgment task,
Experiment 3).
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we measured reaction times (RTs) to highly
visually imageable concrete words and low imageability abstract
words in a concreteness judgment task with and without concur-
rent visual interference. We predicted that concrete words should
be affected more strongly by visual noise because the affirmative





































































































1216 OSTAREK AND HUETTIG
on visual information represented in brain regions processing
low-level visual information. Although it is conceivable that ab-
stract word meanings are grounded in sensory experience (Kousta,
Vigliocco, Vinson, Andrews, & Del Campo, 2011; Vigliocco et
al., 2014), it seems unlikely that visual features are accessed with
a degree of specificity comparable to that required for object word
processing. RTs to abstract words thus served as a baseline con-
dition allowing us to separate possible general distraction effects
of the visual noise manipulation from ‘functional interference’
effects related specifically to semantic processing of visually dom-
inant concepts. We thus predicted an interaction between word
type and visual interference, such that responses to concrete words
should be slowed down more than responses to abstract words.
Method
Participants. Participants in this experiment were 50 native
Dutch speakers. They all had normal or corrected-to-normal vision
and hearing, were paid and gave written consent. Participant
numbers were determined in advance on the basis that approxi-
mately 50 participants should yield ample statistical power to
detect the effects of interest in this kind of semantic task, given
previous work (e.g., Neely, Keefe, & Ross, 1989). Data collection
was stopped when this number was reached. The study was ap-
proved by the Ethics Board of the Faculty of Social Sciences of the
Radboud University.
Stimuli and apparatus. The visual stimuli were presented on
a computer screen (resolution: 1900  720, refresh rate: 60 Hz)
in 55 cm viewing distance using Presentation Software (Version
16.2; see www.neurobs.com). They included a central fixation
cross to initiate each trial and the visual interference patterns
(random Mondrian-type colorful rectangular shapes changing at 12
Hz) which are typically used for continuous flash suppression
studies because they interfere strongly with low-level visual pro-
cessing (see Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005, for discussion). Fifty-two
highly visually imageable concrete words (henceforth “concrete
words”) and 52 low imageability abstract words (henceforth ab-
stract words) that were selected on the basis of their high versus
low visual imageability were recorded by a female Dutch speaker
using Audacity Software. A norming study with the 50 participants
of Experiment 1 (conducted after the main experiment) showed
that the two word types indeed differed strongly in visual image-
ability (Likert scale 1–7; concrete words: M  6.4, SD  0.2;
abstract words: M  2.9, SD  0.8; p  .001), which was used as
a proxy to gauge how visually dominant the concepts are.1 The
word types also differed significantly (p  .001) in terms of
concreteness ratings (Brysbaert, Stevens, De Deyne, Voorspoels,
& Storms, 2014); on a Likert scale from 1–5 abstract words had a
mean of 2.2 (0.7), concrete words 4.7 (0.3). Words from the two
word types were matched for length (concrete: M 518 ms, SD
72 ms vs. abstract: M  530 ms, SD  79ms, t1), number of
syllables (abstract: M  1.8, SD  0.5; concrete: M  1.6, SD 
0.5, t1), number of phonemes (abstract: M  5.0, SD  0.9;
concrete: M  4.8, SD  1.1, t1), and frequency (abstract: M 
63.6, SD  70.6; concrete: M  64.9, SD  94.9, t1) using the
SUBTLEX-NL database (Keuleers, Brysbaert, & New, 2010).
Procedure. At the beginning of each trial a fixation cross
appeared at the center of the screen for 800 ms. Immediately
afterward participants heard a spoken word accompanied either by
a blank screen or by visual noise. Participants were instructed to
decide as quickly and as accurately as possible whether the spoken
word was concrete or abstract by pressing one of two buttons with
their left or right index finger. When a response was made or 2 s
had elapsed after word onset a blank screen replaced the visual
noise patterns (when present) and was shown for 1,000 ms after
which the next trial started. Every word was presented twice; once
with and once without visual noise to obtain a 2 (Word Type;
concrete object vs. abstract)  2 (Visual Condition; flashes vs.
blank screen) within-subjects design and a total of 208 experimen-
tal trials. The experiment was organized in two blocks with all 104
spoken words presented in random order. Each word was accom-
panied by visual noise either in the first or the second block.
Analysis. Six items were removed because they produced
mean error rates greater than 25% and one because of a technical
problem (6.7% of all trials).2 Trials with incorrect responses
(3.8%) and RTs slower than 2,000 ms (0.9%) were excluded from
the analysis. The remaining data set was trimmed for outliers by
removing trials with RTs that were more than 2.5 standard devi-
ations from the mean (2.8%). This amounts to 1,508 trials (14.5%)
removed in total. RTs were analyzed with linear mixed effects
models (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008) implemented in RStu-
dio (Version 0.98.945, 2009–2013; RStudio, Inc.) using the lme4
package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014). The full
model contained word type and visual condition as well as the
interaction between the two as fixed effects and by-participants ran-
dom slopes and intercepts for both fixed effects and by-items slopes
and intercepts for the effect of visual condition.3 -values (represent-
ing estimates based on scaled RTs), t values and p values were
obtained by using the function get_pvalues from the psy811 pack-
age. Additionally, for the critical interaction the full model was
compared with a second model from which only the interaction
term was removed using a likelihood ratio test (with the command
anova). Finally, to estimate the effect size of the predicted differ-
ence in the impact of visual noise on concrete versus abstract
words we calculated Cohen’s d based on least-square means using
the lsmeans package.
Results and Discussion
There was a main effect of word type (  .33, SE  .07,
t  4.65, p  .001), reflecting faster responses to concrete
words. This commonly observed “concreteness effect” is typically
attributed to richer representations of concrete words arising from
differences in imageability or context availability between con-
crete and abstract words (Paivio, 1986, 2013, 2014; Schwanenflu-
gel, 1991; Schwanenflugel & Shoben, 1983; Schwanenflugel, Har-
nishfeger, & Stowe, 1988). There was also a main effect of visual
condition (  .13, SE  .03, t  4.76, p  .001) reflecting
slower responses on trials with visual noise. Critically, there was a
robust interaction between word type and visual condition
(  .1, SE  .04, t  3.00; likelihood ratio test: 2(1)  9.01,
1 In particular, participants were asked how strong a mental image they
experienced when hearing the word (1  no specific image whatsoever,
7  a very strong and clear mental image).
2 The audio file corresponding to the word verlies (loss) was corrupted
such that it was very difficult to recognize it.
3 A model that additionally included random effects for the interaction of





































































































1217VISUAL NOISE INTERFERES WITH CONCRETE OBJECT WORD COMPREHENSION
p  .002). As predicted, visual noise affected responses to con-
crete words more strongly (see Figure 1). The mean difference was
21 ms with Cohen’s d  0.61 which is commonly interpreted as a
medium effect size.
Our results therefore suggest that concrete words rely more
strongly on visual features and, more importantly, that the visual
system was recruited for the comprehension of concrete words.
The present finding that visual interference disrupts semantic
processing of concrete words constitutes direct evidence that basic
low-level visual processes can be causally involved in word com-
prehension. One study along these lines reported that dot patterns
moving up or down at near-threshold interfered with the compre-
hension of verbs with up/down association (rise vs. fall) when their
direction was incongruent with the verb meaning (Meteyard, Zo-
kaei, Bahrami, & Vigliocco, 2008). Whereas that study focused on
one particular perceptual feature of a class of verbs, our data speak
to the comprehension of concrete words more generally. What is
striking about our findings is that the visual interference technique
we used specifically interferes with basic low-level processes, as it
only consists of horizontal and vertical components and colors, all
of which recruit early visual cortical regions (see Yuval-Greenberg
& Heeger, 2013). This indicates that participants did not solely
rely on high-level representations but built low-level visual repre-
sentations on the spot. The recruitment of visual processes typi-
cally involved in local feature processing is consistent with the
online construction of an idiosyncratic visual representation typi-
cal of bottom-up processing and episodic memory retrieval
(Danker & Anderson, 2010; Ueno et al., 2007). We propose that,
in the current task situation, spoken words activate processes akin
to conscious visual perception in order to solve the sensory judg-
ment task.
Experiment 2
Though the results of Experiment 1 are striking, it is of crucial
importance for our research question to determine to what extent
the visual interference effect reported here is task-dependent. Does
spoken object word processing always rely on low-level visual
processes? Or, alternatively, are low-level visual representations
only involved in spoken word processing when the task requires
retrieval of visual information? We tested this issue by repeating
the Visual Noise study in an auditory LDT.
Note that although access of semantic information may not be
strictly necessary to perform this task, a vast number of lexical
decision studies have shown that semantic information is typically
accessed and speeds up RTs (e.g., Bentin, McCarthy, & Wood,
1985; Fischler, 1977; Holcomb & Neville, 1990; Hutchison, 2003;
Perea & Rosa, 2002; Thompson-Schill, Kurtz, & Gabrieli, 1998).
This makes it an interesting testing ground for the hypothesis that
task demands determine what kinds of information are retrieved
during language processing: As detailed visual knowledge about
word referents is not required to perform a LDT, such accounts
predict no specific interference of visual noise with object word
processing. If, however, sensory representations are activated au-
tomatically and have a functional contribution whenever spoken
concrete words are heard (e.g., Gallese & Lakoff, 2005), the Visual
Condition  Word Type interaction from Experiment 1 should
persist.
Method
Participants. Native Dutch participants (N 46) with normal
or corrected-to-normal vision and hearing completed the experi-
ment. They gave written consent and were paid for participation.
Sample size and stopping rule were determined in the same way as
in Experiment 1.
Stimuli, apparatus, and procedure. Stimuli, apparatus and
procedure were identical to Experiment 1, with the following
exceptions: 42 instead of 52 items per word type were used and
168 pseudowords added, which resulted in a total of 336 trials.4
We used the program Wuggy (Keuleers & Brysbaert, 2010) to
create pseudowords that differed in one or two phonemes from
existing words making the lexical decision relatively difficult.
Participants had to indicate as quickly and as accurately as possible
whether the word they heard was an existing Dutch word or not by
pressing one of two buttons.
Results and Discussion
Four participants had to be excluded because of error rates
greater than 25%. The data of the remaining 42 participants were
trimmed for errors (2.4%), timed-out responses (1.1%), and outli-
ers (2.4%). The remaining data (a total of 1,103/14.3% of trials
was removed) were analyzed in the same way as in Experiment 1
with the exception that the model only included by-participants
random slopes for visual condition, as the full model did not
converge. There was a main effect of visual condition (  .24,
SE .03, t 8.774, p .001) reflecting slower responses in trials
with visual noise but no main effect of word type (t  1) and no
statistically significant interaction (t  1, see Figure 2).
4 We removed the error-prone items from Experiment 1 and some
additional items to keep the duration of the experiment similar to Exper-
iment 1 without sacrificing statistical power, at the same time making sure
that the experimental conditions remained well-matched in terms of fre-
quency and so forth.
Figure 1. Mean reaction times (RTs) of all four conditions, error bars
indicate 95% confidence intervals. See the online article for the color





































































































1218 OSTAREK AND HUETTIG
These results suggest that in the context of a LDT, visual
representations were not functionally involved in object word
processing. Experiment 2 thus constrains theories of conceptual
processing because it shows that the functional relevance of the
visual system for language processing is contingent on task re-
quirements. Our results of course do not conclusively rule out that
low-level visual representations were activated in the present task.
What we can conclude however is that if they were activated they
did not have a detectable functional role. Note that the reason for
this is unlikely to be lacking sensitivity of our technique, as
Experiment 1 clearly shows that our paradigm can reveal an
involvement of low-level visual processes when it is present.
Despite the clear evidence of semantic and (lexical) visual
priming in many previous lexical decision studies one may ques-
tion what information our participants activated in Experiment 2.
There is some evidence that words automatically activate nonas-
sociative semantic information, such as information about percep-
tual features. Some studies found priming effects among words
with perceptually similar referents (pizza–coin) using lexical de-
cision (d’Arcais, Schreuder, & Glazenborg, 1985; Schreuder,
d’Arcais, & Glazenborg, 1984). On the other hand, Pecher, Zeelen-
berg, and Raaijmakers (1998) pointed out several methodological
shortcomings with these data and, using an improved design, only
observed this effect when participants performed a perceptual
categorization task before the priming experiment but not in a
standard LDT. These findings and our present data thus suggest
that visual representations are not automatically retrieved when-
ever spoken words are heard.
Experiment 3
Because we cannot be sure that the LDT used in Experiment 2
involved semantic access we conducted a third experiment to
further investigate the extent to which low-level visual represen-
tations are accessed in tasks requiring semantic access. To this end
we used a word class decision task (is the word you are presented
with a noun or adjective?). Although there are certainly several
ways by which the word class of a word can in principle be
determined (Kemmerer, 2014a), it seems unlikely that semantic
access is completely bypassed. At the same time, it is sufficient to
access highly schematic conceptual representations that are largely
shared among nouns to solve the task: Nouns are nongradable,
nonrelational, temporally stable entities, whereas adjectives refer
to gradable qualities and are used for modification (Croft, 2001;
Kemmerer, 2014a). As such, there is no need to access detailed
visual feature information. If low-level visual representations are
automatically accessed and are functionally relevant during se-
mantic spoken word processing regardless of contextual demands,
visual noise should nevertheless interfere more with word class
decisions to concrete nouns than abstract nouns (i.e., a significant
visual noise by word type interaction). Alternatively, according to
the flexible processing account, basic visual processes could be
recruited specifically in situations where in-depth visual informa-
tion needs to be retrieved, in which case concrete words should not
be affected by visual noise than abstract words.
Method
Participants. Native Dutch participants (N 48) with normal
or corrected-to-normal vision and hearing completed the experi-
ment. They gave written consent and were paid for participation.
Sample size and stopping rule were determined in the same way as
in Experiment 1 and 2.
Stimuli, apparatus, and procedure. Stimuli, apparatus and
procedure were identical to Experiment 1 and 2, with the following
exceptions: We used 40 concrete and abstract nouns and 80 ad-
jectives which were all presented twice, resulting in a total of 320
trials. Participants had to indicate as quickly and as accurately as
possible whether the word they heard was a noun or an adjective
by pressing one of two buttons. Similar to the nouns, adjectives
were half concrete (mean concreteness rating: 3.6, SD  0.5) and
half abstract (M 2.6, SD 0.8) and differed significantly on this
dimension (p .001), such that these factors were not confounded.
Abstract and concrete adjectives were also matched for frequency
(concrete: M  24.6, SD  46.8; abstract: M  30.0; SD  53.6;
t  1), number of phonemes (concrete: M  5.5, SD  2.0;
abstract: M  5.5, SD  2.0; t  1), and number of syllables
(concrete: M  1.8, SD  0.8; abstract: M  2.0, SD  0.9; t  1).
Results
Two participants had to be excluded due to high error rates
(25%). The data from the remaining 46 participants were
trimmed for errors (6.5%), time-outs (1.9%), and outliers (2.1%).
A total of 1,129 trials (14.8%) were thus removed. A linear
mixed-effects model (equal in structure to the one used in Exper-
iment 1) revealed a main effect of visual condition (  .206, t 
6.178, SE  .033, p  .001) with slower responses in visual noise
trials. There was also a main effect of word type (  .511,
SE  .083, t  6.151, p  .001) with slower responses to
abstract words, as in Experiment 1. Critically, the interaction
between the two was not significant (t  1.06). Thus, visual
noise again affected concrete and abstract words to the same
amount (see Figure 3).
Follow-up analysis and discussion. Our results across three
experiments indicate that low-level visual representations are only
functionally relevant in task situations that require visual informa-
Figure 2. Mean reaction times (RTs) of all four conditions, error bars
indicate 95% confidence intervals. See the online article for the color





































































































1219VISUAL NOISE INTERFERES WITH CONCRETE OBJECT WORD COMPREHENSION
tion to be retrieved and that other semantic tasks do not rely on
their contribution. As Table 1 indicates, visual noise interfered
much stronger with concrete object word processing relative to
abstract word processing in Experiment 1 but not in Experiments
2 and 3.
To assess statistically whether the effect was specific to the
concreteness task, we conducted a post hoc mixed effects model
with experiment (Experiment 1 vs. 2 vs. 3) as an additional
factor. There was indeed a three-way interaction between visual
condition, word type, and experiment (likelihood ratio test:
2[2]  8.412, p  .0149). The effect of visual noise on
concrete words was larger in Experiment 1 compared with
Experiment 2 (  0.117, SE  .055, t  2.145, p  .0319)
and compared with Experiment 3 (  0.147, SE  .055,
t  2.681, p  .007). The difference between Experiments 1
and 3 is particularly important. Although it is possible that
participants relied on phonological processing for the LDT, the
noun versus adjective decision task requires semantic access.
This would also explain the stronger similarity of Experiment 1
and 3 in terms of RT distributions, as evidenced by a main
effect of word type (the “concreteness effect”) that was absent
in Experiment 2. The absence of an interference effect of visual
noise on concrete word processing in a task that requires
semantic— but not specifically visual—information supports
the view that low-level visual processes are not reflexively
recruited for object word comprehension. Rather, they consti-
tute an optional processing channel for situations that rely on
the retrieval of visual features. It is important to note that
Experiment 1 clearly shows that the interference technique we
used is capable of revealing an involvement of low-level visual
processes when it is present. Therefore, the absence of inter-
ference effects in Experiments 2 and 3 are unlikely due to a lack
of sensitivity of the method but rather attributable to the lack of
a functional role of low-level visual processes in these tasks.
General Discussion
In the present study, we used a visual interference paradigm
to study the extent to which low-level visual representations are
causally involved in spoken word comprehension. Our main
finding is that dynamic Mondrian masks that are known to
hinder basic low-level visual processing slowed down re-
sponses to high-imageability concrete words, as compared to
low-imageability abstract words, but only in a task situation
that required visual information to be accessed. This result is in
line with embodied theories of conceptual processing only to
the extent that they are embedded in a flexible processing
framework (Hoenig et al., 2008; Lebois et al., 2015). Note that
a central aspect of our study is the significant interaction
between visual noise and word type (with a bigger effect of
visual noise on visually imageable concrete than abstract
words). This allows us to separate (potential) general distrac-
tion effects of the visual noise manipulation from ‘functional
interference’ effects. Distraction effects likely account for the
main effect of visual noise but cannot account for the visual
noise by word type interaction observed in Experiment 1.
It is important to point out that we are agnostic with regard
to whether the visual representations retrieved in the present
study constitute mental imagery (cf. Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thomp-
son, 2001; Pearson, Naselaris, Holmes, & Kosslyn, 2015) or
what sometimes is referred to as simulations (e.g., Barsalou,
1999, 2008). In our view there is currently no evidence avail-
able that conclusively shows that imagery and simulations are
distinct. What our findings show is that low-level visual pro-
cesses are causally involved in semantic processing but (cru-
cially) only when the task requires it, regardless of whether one
prefers to call these processes imagery or simulation.
We observed that visual interference affected object word
processing more than abstract word processing in a concrete-
ness task (Experiment 1), whereas it affected abstract and
concrete words to the same extent in a lexical-decision task
(Experiment 2) and a word class decision task (Experiment 3).
This suggests that task demands have a strong impact on the
processing channels that are used for semantic processing. We
are not the first to argue for flexible activation of modality-
specific representations (Hoenig et al., 2008; Lebois et al.,
2015; van Dam et al., 2011). What has not been shown before
however is that the functional role of low-level visual repre-
sentations is task-dependent. Our data suggest that visual pro-
cesses are functionally relevant when in-depth visual informa-
tion is required (e.g., about the physical properties of a word’s
referent, as in a concreteness task), while other sources of
Table 1
Overview of Interference Effects Across Experiments
Word type Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Concrete 50 ms 43 ms 34 ms
Abstract 28 ms 44 ms 45 ms
Interference score 22 ms 1 ms 11 ms
Note. Interference was calculated for each word type and experiment by
subtracting mean reaction times in blank screen trials from mean reaction
times in visual noise trials. The interference score represents the difference
in interference between both word types.
Figure 3. Mean reaction times (RTs) of all four conditions, error bars
indicate 95% confidence intervals. See the online article for the color
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information are preferentially accessed for tasks that do not
require such information. This view is supported by a recent
study by Edmiston and Lupyan (2017) who found that visual
interference impairs participants’ ability to make use of visual
but not encyclopedic knowledge during word processing.
Our paradigm specifically assessed whether visual represen-
tations were necessary for the tasks at hand, not whether they
were activated. For instance, in a continuous flash suppression
study we recently found evidence that passive listening of
object words activates visual processes involved in a task as
basic as visual detection (Ostarek & Huettig, in press). Simi-
larly, a recent magnetoencephalography study (Lewis & Poep-
pel, 2014) using an auditory LDT found a correlation between
imageability and activity in visual association cortex within the
first 200 ms after word onset. In the light of findings like these,
we do not intend to rule out an involvement of the visual system
in the LDT and word class decision experiments, but we can tell
from the data that it did not have a functional role in these tasks.
Related to this, we do not argue that visual representations are
secondary for object word comprehension. To illustrate, nobody
would claim that blueness is a secondary feature of “blue,” just
because a Stroop task only leads to interference in certain condi-
tions, but not others (Besner, Stolz, & Boutilier, 1997; Goldfarb,
Aisenberg, & Henik, 2011; Jacoby, Lindsay, & Hessels, 2003; see
Kemmerer, 2014b for discussion). What our study shows is that
modality-specific visual representations are causally involved in
word comprehension if the task situation is conducive for the use
of visual information.
To further bolster this conclusion, future studies could investi-
gate whether the amount of interference is predicted by the rele-
vance of visual attributes, which can be assessed with attribute
ratings (Binder et al., 2016). This seems to follow from recent
fMRI studies establishing a relationship between visual aspects of
word meaning and brain activity in visual brain areas (Fernandino,
Binder, et al., 2015; Fernandino, Humphries, et al., 2015). Fur-
thermore, different kinds of interference could be used to target
specific features, such as color, motion, or shape.
Our data fit within a framework of flexible and dynamical
conceptual processing encompassing low-level modality-
specific as well as high-level systems. It would be important for
future work to characterize the exact roles, representational
nature and interplay of these systems during online language
processing. First steps have recently been made in a series of
MEG studies that identified enhanced connectivity between
anterior temporal lobe (ATL) and modality-specific sensory
areas during semantic processing (van Ackeren, 2014). In the
light of these findings, two exciting possibilities emerge: (1)
Information related to the different multimodal aspects of the
given word meaning is retrieved from multiple sensory areas
and then converges in ATL where it might be bound (e.g.,
Patterson, Nestor, & Rogers, 2007; Pobric, Jefferies, & Ralph,
2010). In that case ATL would contain compressed multimodal
information that may suffice for some semantic tasks. (2) ATL
combines contextual factors and stimulus-driven input to pick
out those distributed cortical areas that contain relevant infor-
mation and activates them in concert, possibly binding them via
theta-phase locking (Varela, Lachaux, Rodriguez, & Martinerie,
2001). In that case ATL might not contain semantic knowledge,
but have a critical control function necessary for semantic
access. Our results suggest that such long-range networks can
span all the way into early visual regions, but that their func-
tional role depends heavily on task requirements.
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